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THE SCA’S STANDING CONUNDRUM
Aviv S . Halpern*
The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) arms federal law enforcement
agencies with the ability to use a special type of warrant to access users’ elec-
tronically stored communications . In some circumstances, SCA warrants can
require service providers to bundle and produce a user’s electronically stored
communications without ever disclosing the existence of the warrant to the
individual user until charges are brought . Users that are charged will ulti-
mately receive notice of the search after the fact through their legal proceed-
ings . Users that are never charged, however, may never know that their
communications were obtained and searched . This practice effectively makes
the provisions of the SCA that allow for nondisclosure unreviewable by the
judiciary . Users that were searched but not charged have standing to chal-
lenge the scope of these warrants, but receive no notice that the search oc-
curred . Service providers receive notice, but have no standing on behalf of
their users under the Fourth Amendment . This Note argues that the nondis-
closure orders therefore create a procedural due process violation in addition
to a Fourth Amendment violation . Users may have their privacy and proper-
ty interests infringed without a meaningful opportunity to be heard . Under a
due process theory, as opposed to a Fourth Amendment theory, this practice
can finally be judicially reviewed .
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INTRODUCTION
Access to the internet has become such an integral part of society that
the United Nations has declared it a fundamental human right.1 Even the
Supreme Court has acknowledged that we are officially in the “Cyber Age.”2
But because internet access and online storage require third-party service
providers, there may be significant constitutional issues with respect to elec-
tronically stored information (“ESI”). Under the third-party doctrine, the
Fourth Amendment generally does not protect information disclosed to
third parties.3 And because electronic communications often require the in-
volvement of third-party service providers, it is unclear whether the Fourth
Amendment provides any meaningful protection to information stored by
third parties,4 let alone electronically stored communications (“ESC”).5 The
risk of providing the government with unfettered access to potentially sensi-
tive ESI motivated Congress to pass the Stored Communications Act
1. Tim Sandle, UN Thinks Internet Access Is a Human Right, BUS. INSIDER (July 22,
2016, 11:57 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/un-says-internet-access-is-a-human-right-
2016-7 [https://perma.cc/PW44-L8W5].
2. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2224 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“It
is true that the Cyber Age has vast potential both to expand and restrict individual freedoms in
dimensions not contemplated in earlier times.”).
3 . See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 443–44 (1976). But see Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (declining to extend Smith and Miller
to cover historical cell-site location information).
4. How the third-party doctrine will extend beyond Carpenter is still an open question.
As of now, several theories could arguably cover electronically stored communications, but
none are widely, or even consistently, applied. See, e .g ., Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the
Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012) (mosaic theory); Orin S. Kerr, Applying the
Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1025–29
(2010) (content/non-content).
5. Because the Stored Communications Act primarily applies to ESC—a narrow subset
of ESI—most of the following analysis will be limited to electronic communications. Explicit
language will be used to delineate when a portion of the analysis applies strictly to ESC or more
broadly to ESI. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
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(“SCA”),6 ensuring that at least some protection extends to electronic infor-
mation.7
Congress passed the SCA in 1986, before the infrastructure and capabili-
ties of the internet were truly understood.8 The SCA provides a statutory
framework for determining when the government can access certain types of
ESC from third-party service providers.9 More specifically, the Act enumer-
ates special tools for government agents to access ESC—including subpoe-
nas, court orders, and warrants (“SCA warrants”)—and permits searches
without notice.10
Sometimes, with the use of nondisclosure orders, the Act even prohibits
service providers from informing targeted users of a search. Until recently,
many of the nondisclosure orders existed in perpetuity—preventing any no-
tice to the user.11 Because of an October 2017 guidance document issued by
the Department of Justice, federal prosecutors may prevent disclosure for up
to one year.12 In some circumstances, “federal prosecutors can seek gag or-
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2713. The Stored Communications Act has confusingly been re-
ferred to by many names: the “Electronic Communications Privacy Act” or “ECPA” because it
was part of a larger bill amending the Wiretap Act; “Chapter 121” because it was codified in
Chapter 121 of Title 18 of the United States Code; the “Stored Wire and Electronic Communi-
cations and Transactional Records Access” statute because of its formal title in Chapter 121;
and “Title II” because it was originally enacted as the second title to the ECPA. Orin S. Kerr, A
User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1208 n.1 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, A User’s Guide]; see also Orin S.
Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 382 (2014).
For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to it simply as the “Stored Communication Act,” or
“SCA.”
7 . See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701, 2703, 2707 (creating criminal penalties, setting forth proce-
dures limiting government access, and creating a private right of action to remedy conduct that
fails to comply).
8. The Stored Communications Act was largely built around the two predominant
functions of the internet in 1986: electronic communications services and remote computing
services. See Kerr, A User’s Guide, supra note 6, at 1213–14. These distinctions are outmoded
and do not truly reflect how computer networks work in the modern age. They have resulted
in “freezing into law the understandings of computer network use as of 1986.” Id . at 1214. But
this conception is significantly different from the modern understanding of the internet. The
World Wide Web, cloud computing services, and online social networks would not exist for
another decade. Ryan A. Ward, Note, Discovering Facebook: Social Network Subpoenas and the
Stored Communications Act, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 563, 566 (2011).
9 . See 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
10 . Id .
11. Jennifer Daskal, Notice and Standing in the Fourth Amendment: Searches of Personal
Data, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 437, 439–40 (2017) (citing Ellen Nakashima, Justice De-




12. Rod J. Rosenstein, Memorandum to Heads of Department Law Enforcement Compo-
nents, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 2 (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/page/file/
1005791/download [https://perma.cc/5XKP-M3Y6], cited in Daskal, supra note 11, at 440.
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ders that last longer than a year. . . . The guidance does not bind state prose-
cutors.”13
Although this guidance changes federal policy, it has not yet been adopt-
ed into law. In the meantime, the government is still afforded the ability to
conduct searches without, or with significantly delayed, notice. This practice
means that, during the period of secrecy, there is no one with both standing
and notice to challenge the search or seizure, “thus eliminating one of the
most powerful checks on government overreach.”14
Challenges to SCA warrants on Fourth Amendment grounds have
failed. Fourth Amendment standing doctrine limits challenges to claimants
whose own reasonable expectations of privacy were violated.15 Courts have
yet to address, however, whether a procedural due process challenge would
permit third-party standing. Because the statute does not require authorities
to notify a user of a search, the following circumstance arises: the user, who
has standing under the Fourth Amendment but no notice of the search, can-
not challenge the search or seizure; whereas the service provider, who has
notice but no Fourth Amendment standing, cannot assert the user’s rights.
This Note argues that due process claims—as opposed to Fourth Amend-
ment claims—can overcome this standing conundrum. The due process the-
ory allows for a novel standing argument that should circumvent the Fourth
Amendment’s barriers to third-party standing and finally provide an oppor-
tunity to check government overreach. The search and seizure deprives the
user of property and privacy interests in their communications without a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.16 And because the statute lacks a data-
deletion requirement, the deprivation could potentially be indefinite.
This Note analyzes these due process concerns. It proposes legislative
action and suggests alternative theories to assert users’ rights until legislative
action is taken. Part I provides background information on the history and
role of the SCA. Part II explains the Fourth Amendment standing problem
and how the nondisclosure orders make SCA warrants unreviewable because
no one with standing will have notice. Part III argues that use of SCA war-
rants presents unique procedural due process concerns because of the lack of
13. Daskal, supra note 11, at 440; see also Rosenstein, supra note 12, at 2.
14. Daskal, supra note 11, at 441.
15. Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 137 (2008); see, e .g ., Mi-
crosoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887, 915 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (“Based on
the foregoing analysis, the court concludes that Microsoft may not bring a claim to vindicate
its customers’ Fourth Amendment rights. Although the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit
routinely employ the third-party standing doctrine to cases involving constitutional rights, that
doctrine is in tension with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”); In re 381 Search Warrants
Directed to Facebook, Inc., 14 N.Y.S.3d 23 (App. Div. 2015) (rejecting Facebook’s pre-
enforcement challenge regarding the scope of nearly 400 “bulk” warrants served with indefinite
nondisclosure orders).
16. In a broader article, Judge Stephen Wm. Smith briefly identifies the standing issue
that arises in these circumstances. See Stephen Wm. Smith, Gagged, Sealed & Delivered: Re-
forming ECPA’s Secret Docket, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 313, 330 (2012).
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notice and an opportunity to be heard. Then, Part VI lays out the third-party
standing argument under a due process theory.
I. THE INTERSECTION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND THE
INTERNET
Traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence does not neatly apply to
modern technological advancements.17 Intended to protect individuals from
government overreach, the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment restricts the government’s ability to search and to seize, where-
as warrants provide a legal tool that authorizes it to do so.18 Warrantless
searches, on the other hand, are “per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment,” subject only to a few exceptions.19 Administrative searches are
one such exception. In these cases, a “special need” makes the warrant and
probable-cause requirements impracticable when seeking information from
third-party records.20
But Fourth Amendment doctrine was developed for physical spaces, not
cyberspace.21 The doctrine’s foray into the cyberworld has been fraught with
difficulty and unease; electronic communications are no exception. So, to
provide guidance on procedures when seeking access to ESI, Congress
passed the Stored Communications Act.22 This Part will broadly discuss the
application of the Fourth Amendment to ESI, specifically focusing on the
17 . See, e .g ., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
18. Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 333 (2015). The
Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see also Massachusetts v. Sheppard,
468 U.S. 981, 988 n.5 (1984) (“[A] search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to con-
form to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional.”).
20. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015). There are several other
exceptions to the warrant requirement, but none of them seem to apply as explicitly as the ad-
ministrative search exception. See, e .g ., United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152–53
(2004) (border search exception); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 573 (1991) (automobile
exception); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (consent exception); Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (plain view exception); Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (search incident to arrest exception); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20
(1968) (Terry stop exception).
21 . See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (“The text of the Fourth
Amendment reflects its close connection to property, since otherwise it would have referred
simply to ‘the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures’; the
phrase ‘in their persons, houses, papers, and effects’ would have been superfluous.” (quoting
U.S. CONST. amend. IV)).
22. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–13 (2012).
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SCA. Section I.A explains the role of the SCA. Section I.B lays out the statu-
tory framework governing access to electronic communications. Section I.C
explores the differences between traditional warrants and SCA warrants and
explains how the differences can result in the denial of an individual’s proce-
dural due process right.
A. The SCA’s Role as a Legislative Protection for ESC
After “the advent of computerized recordkeeping systems,”23 Congress
became increasingly concerned about the potential “erosion of [the] precious
right” to privacy.24 And at the time, the third-party doctrine seemed to oper-
ate as a bright-line rule, discarding any expectation of privacy in information
shared with a third party25—like a company operating a recordkeeping sys-
tem. This led to concerns that network and internet activities would be out-
side Fourth Amendment protection.26 The Fourth Amendment only reaches
spaces considered to be constitutionally protected, such as a person’s home,27
as well as other areas where someone has a reasonable expectation of priva-
cy, such as a phone booth.28
When accessing computer networks, such as the internet, there is no
physical “home” to consider.29 In other words, one’s physical location when
accessing the internet does not change Fourth Amendment analysis. Wheth-
er a “conversation” over a computer network occurred while the participants
were physically inside their homes does not provide any additional protec-
tion. Yet, if the conversation occurred in person between two individuals in-
side their home, it would likely be protected. The internet complicates
matters because, unlike a physical conversation, accessing computer net-
works and recordkeeping systems often requires the cooperation of third-
party service providers, potentially diminishing any expectation of privacy in
the information.30
The SCA exists to address these concerns and provide statutory protec-
tions for ESC,31 extending some of the traditional Fourth Amendment pro-
23. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986).
24. H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 19 (1986).
25 . See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
26. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986).
27 . See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586–87 (1980); see also United States v. Jones,
565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (revitalizing the property approach to the Fourth Amendment).
28 . See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. Kerr, A User’s Guide, supra note 6, at 1209.
30. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986) (“Nevertheless, because it is subject to control by a
third-party computer operator, the information may be subject to no constitutional privacy
protection.”).
31. The architecture of computer networks has had “profound consequences for how
the Fourth Amendment protects Internet communications—or perhaps more accurately, how
the Fourth Amendment may not protect such communications much at all.” Kerr, A User’s
Guide, supra note 6, at 1210.
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tections to an area of law fraught with uncertainty.32 Further indicative of its
intent, Congress baked the traditional warrant requirement of Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 41 (“Rule 41”) into the statute.33 But at the time the
SCA was passed, Congress did not yet understand how old legal doctrines—
let alone the Fourth Amendment—would apply to the internet.34 Since 1986,
however, the internet has changed. Internet access still requires a third-party
service provider, but service providers can no longer be classified neatly into
the regulated categories the SCA created.
B. Statutory Framework for Governmental Access to ESC
To access ESC from a third-party service provider, government agencies
must navigate the SCA framework.35 First, a government agency must classi-
fy the holder of the information as either an electronic communications ser-
vice36 or as a remote computing service.37 This distinction is based on
Congress’s understanding of how the internet operated in 1986. An electron-
ic communications service uses computer networks to allow users to com-
municate with one another.38 When sending and receiving electronic
communications on the 1980s internet, it was common for service providers
to temporarily store data pending delivery.39 Sometimes this data was backed
up in temporary “electronic storage” for several months.40 Alternatively, a
remote computing service is a third-party service that provides sophisticated
data processing or storage.41 In an era before spreadsheet software, users
transmitted their data to a third-party computing service for processing or
32 . See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3; H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 17–19 (1986).
33 . See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), (b)(1)(A) (2012); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
34. Before Congress passed the SCA in 1986, courts were confused about the applicabil-
ity of certain laws to the internet. E .g ., Briggs v. Am. Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 415 (5th Cir.
1980) (calling the Wiretap Act an “amorphous Congressional enactment” requiring the court
to traverse the “fog of inclusions and exclusions” to apply them to the case at bar). The subse-
quent amendments to the Wiretap Act and the adoption of the modern SCA framework did
little to clear up such confusion. See, e .g ., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874
(9th Cir. 2002) (“Courts have struggled to analyze problems involving modern technology
within the confines of [the SCA] framework, often with unsatisfying results.”); United States v.
Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998) (“When the Fifth Circuit observed that the Wiretap
Act ‘is famous (if not infamous) for its lack of clarity,’ . . . it might have put the matter too
lightly.”). For a more in-depth explanation of some of the difficulties the SCA was intended to
address, see Kerr, A User’s Guide, supra note 6, at 1209–13.
35 . See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–11.
36 . See id . § 2703(a), (c).
37 . See id . § 2703(b)–(c).
38 . Id . §§ 2711(1), 2510(15). Electronic communications services include email services,
Facebook Messenger, and most other direct messaging systems.
39. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2–3, 16 (1986).
40. Kerr, A User’s Guide, supra note 6, at 1213.
41. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 10–11.
1704 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:1697
storage42—tasks that today can be accomplished using a simple program
without need for outsourcing.43
Although this classification scheme is outmoded and has largely become
an exercise of confusing line drawing, the existing SCA framework requires
courts to draw these distinctions so they can determine which rules apply. At
times, courts have even concluded that the same service provider is an “elec-
tronic communication service” for some content and a “remote computing
service” for other content.44 But it is also possible for a service provider not
to fit in either category. To illustrate, imagine Jack sends an email to Jill.45
Before Jill opens the email, Jill’s ISP service acts as an electronic communica-
tion service: the email is in temporary electronic storage until Jill retrieves
the email.46 Once the message is retrieved, Jill can either delete the email,
download it as a file, or leave it on the ISP’s server for safekeeping. If the
email remains on the ISP’s server, the ISP’s role has changed to a remote
computing service.47 If the message is downloaded, the ISP is no longer ei-
ther an electronic communications service or a remote computing service.48
If it is neither an electronic communications service nor a remote computing
service, the traditional Fourth Amendment protections apply rather than the
SCA.49 Classifying service providers becomes even more confusing when the
SCA is applied to near-instantaneous communications through services such
as Facebook Messenger.50 Facebook would be an electronic communications
service for any unopened messages but a remote computing service for
opened messages that were not deleted. Ultimately, the electronic communi-
cations service and remote computing service dichotomy can be quite signif-
icant because the scope of the SCA’s privacy protection depends on the
classification.51
42 . Id .
43. Kerr, A User’s Guide, supra note 6, at 1214. Modern services that fall within this def-
inition likely include cloud storage services and online compression software.
44 . See, e .g ., Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 982, 987–88, 990
(C.D. Cal. 2010). For a proposal to simplify the SCA and eliminate the ECS and RCS distinc-
tions, see Kerr, A User’s Guide, supra note 6, at 1235–38.
45. For another example, see Kerr, A User’s Guide, supra note 6, at 1216–17.
46 . See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 461–62 (5th Cir.
1994).
47. H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 64–65 (1986) (delineating between unopened and opened
emails stored on servers and noting that opened emails stored on a server are protected by the
provisions for remote computing services).
48. Kerr, A User’s Guide, supra note 6, at 1216–17.
49 . Id . at 1216.
50. Facebook Messenger is an instant messaging service on the Facebook platform that
allows users to send text, video, or picture messages to one another. Can I Unsend a Message on
Facebook Once It Has Been Sent?, FACEBOOK: HELP CENTER, https://www.facebook.com/help/
messenger-app/android/1419818118281034 [https://perma.cc/U8AQ-9YUD].
51 . Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012), with id . § 2703(b).
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After classifying the service provider, the agency may choose from three
information-gathering tools: a court order, a subpoena, or a warrant.52 This
choice is largely driven by the type of ESI sought, as each tool has its own ad-
vantages, disadvantages, and scope.53 For ESC held by an electronic commu-
nications service for 180 days or fewer, the SCA requires a search warrant,
though the statute is silent on whether notice will be provided to the user.54
There is even less statutory protection for ESC held for over 180 days or ESC
held by remote computing services.55 With an SCA warrant, a law enforce-
ment entity can compel disclosure of ESI from a remote computing service
“without required notice to the [user].”56 Moreover, the government may
seek a § 2705(b) order—a nondisclosure order that prohibits the service pro-
vider from informing the targeted user of the search.57
Notably, these tools permit access beyond just ESC.58 Under this statuto-
ry scheme, the government can access a significant amount of private infor-
mation,59 but unlike with traditional warrants, if any notice is given at all, it
will likely be after a long period of time. This key difference diminishes or
eliminates a fundamental check on government overreach.
II. THE NOTICE–STANDING TWO-STEP
When used in conjunction with nondisclosure orders, SCA warrants can
sometimes become unreviewable. If a user is not given notice of a search, the
52 . Id . § 2703.
53. The rules compelling disclosure are structured as an upside-down pyramid. Kerr, A
User’s Guide, supra note 6, at 1222–24. At the base are subpoenas. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2). If a
subpoena is combined with prior notice, a government entity can compel three types of infor-
mation: basic subscriber information, id .; any opened emails or other permanently held files
(through the remote computing service rules), id . § 2703(b); and any contents in temporary
“electronic storage” (such as unretrieved emails) that have been in storage for more than 180
days, id . § 2703(a). Next are court orders. Id . § 2703(b)(B)(ii), (c)(1)(B). With these orders, de-
scribed by § 2703(d), and prior notice, an entity can compel all non-content records, id .
§ 2703(c)(2); any opened emails or other permanently held files (also covered by the remote
computing service rules), id . § 2703(b); and any contents in temporary “electronic storage” that
have been in storage for more than 180 days, § 2703(a). Lastly are SCA warrants, which can
compel everything, including ESC that has been in storage for less than 180 days. See id .
§ 2703(a), (c).
54 . Id . § 2703(a).
55 . See id . § 2703(a)–(b).
56 . Id . § 2703(b)(1)(A), (c) (emphasis added). If the entity utilizes a court order or sub-
poena, notice can be delayed under id . § 2705.
57 . Id . § 2705(b).
58 . See id . § 2703(c) (“A governmental entity may require a provider of electronic
communication service or remote computing service to disclose a record or other information
pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of com-
munications) . . . .”). This information can include, but is not limited to, the user’s name, ad-
dress, telephone and communication records, and means and source of payments. Id .
§ 2703(c)(2).
59. I discuss the difficulty with the particularity requirement in Section II.A infra.
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targeted user has standing, but no notice; the service provider has notice, but
no standing. This Part explains this conundrum. Section II.A explains the
key differences between SCA warrants and traditional warrants. Section II.B
then describes the Fourth Amendment standing issue that results.
A. SCA Warrants and Traditional Warrants
Traditional warrants are distinct from SCA warrants in a few key re-
spects. First, traditional warrants are limited and have a more stringent par-
ticularity requirement. Second, traditional warrants provide for notice to the
party whose information was searched. Finally, traditional warrants include
procedures for the return or destruction of information obtained.
The first difference between SCA warrants and traditional warrants is
the requisite level of particularity. The Fourth Amendment requires that
warrants “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.”60 Accordingly, traditional warrants are limited in
scope.61 In contrast, the immense amount of ESI that exists creates unique
problems for SCA warrants. It is not clear what level of particularity is suffi-
cient,62 considering neither Rule 41 nor the SCA explicitly exempt SCA war-
rants from the particularity requirement. 63 For example, if the government
wishes to obtain any emails pertaining to the alleged fraud Jack committed,
must it delineate the specific dates of the emails, or can it request emails
from a certain time period? Alternatively, can it request all emails ever sent
from that account, even if such a request would disclose substantially more
information than is sought by the warrant? Courts disagree. At least three
different federal courts have required a high degree of particularity when de-
scribing electronic communications.64 Other courts have taken a more gen-
eral view of particularity.65
60. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
61 . See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(A)–(B); see also id . advisory committee’s note to 1990
amendment; United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984) (noting that even though agents
may not know exactly where an object will come to rest, the object to be searched can still be
described with sufficient particularity).
62 . See United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2009) (describing the dif-
ficulties caused because of the “modern development of the personal computer and its ability
to store and intermingle a huge array of one’s personal papers”).
63 . See 18 U.S.C. § 2703; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
64 . See, e .g ., In re Search of Info. Associated with [Redacted]@mac.com that Is Stored at
Premises Controlled by Apple, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 145, 152 (D.D.C.) (“Here, the warrant de-
scribes only certain emails that are to be seized—and the government has only established
probable cause for those emails. Yet it seeks to seize all emails by having them ‘disclosed’ by
Apple.”), vacated, 13 F. Supp. 3d 157 (D.D.C. 2014); In re Applications for Search Warrants for
Info. Associated with Target Email Accounts/Skype Accounts, No. 13-MJ-8163-JPO, 2013 WL
4647554, at *8 (D. Kan. Aug. 27, 2013) (“The target accounts may contain large numbers of
emails and files unrelated to the alleged crimes being investigated or for which the government
has no probable cause to search and seize.”); see also In re U.S.’s Application for a Search War-
rant to Seize & Search Elec. Devices from Edward Cunnius, 770 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1139 (W.D.
Wash. 2011) (denying a search warrant of electronic devices based on the government’s failure
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These types of sweeping descriptions are not atypical of SCA warrants.
For example, in 2013, Facebook was served with 381 warrants seeking twen-
ty-four categories of information, including:
any and all subscriber and account information and user contact infor-
mation . . . account status history . . . historical login information, mini-
feed, status update history, shares, notes, wall and timeline postings to the
target account . . . friend listing, including deleted and removed friends,
networks, group listing, future and past events, all undeleted or saved pho-
tos . . . [and] any private messages.66
Requests like these provide more information about an individual than most
realize.67 Also, the very fact that such a warrant was signed by a judicial of-
ficer demonstrates that at least some judges and magistrates underestimate
the true magnitude of data that exists online.68 The requests in that case, In
re 381 Search Warrants, were not limited to a specific time period; rather, the
government requested a vast amount of ESI, beyond just the ESC, from the
inception of the account until the date specified.69 This may actually be a
greater amount of information than would result from seizing an email ac-
count in its entirety. Sensitive information that would surely be beyond the
scope of the warrant would have been swept up by the request—such as any
of the metadata embedded into the uploaded or deleted pictures.70
The second significant difference is the notice requirement. Traditional
warrants require some form of notice to the searched party that a place has
been searched or property has been seized.71 Rule 41 requires that a copy of
the warrant and a receipt for any property seized be either delivered to the
owner of the property or left where the property was seized, presumably for
to provide for review of the ESI by a “filter team” and forswear reliance on the plain view doc-
trine).
65 . See, e .g ., In re Warrant for All Content & Other Info. Associated with
xxxxxxx@gmail.com Maintained at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 386,
392 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
66. Opening Brief of Appellant Facebook, Inc. at 10–11, In re 381 Search Warrants Di-
rected to Facebook, Inc., 14 N.Y.S.3d 23 (App. Div. 2015) (No. 30178-14).
67 . See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014). While the ESI obtained from
Facebook may be less than that on a personal cell phone, such information can truly paint a
picture of a person’s life.
68 . See In re 381 Search Warrants, 14 N.Y.S.3d 23. To be effective, judges of competent
jurisdiction must review and sign a warrant, signifying that they reviewed the evidence and it
met the probable-cause determination.
69 . See Opening Brief of Appellant Facebook, Inc., supra note 66.
70. Pictures often have geo-tags embedded into the metadata that include the device it
was taken from, where it was taken, and when it was taken. Chris Hoffman, How to See Exactly
Where a Photo Was Taken (and Keep Your Location Private), HOW-TO GEEK (May 17, 2017),
https://www.howtogeek.com/211427/how-to-see-exactly-where-a-photo-was-taken-and-keep-
your-location-private/ [https://perma.cc/ME85-ZW5R].
71. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(C).
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the owner to find.72 Even so, traditional warrants allow for the element of
surprise to minimize the chance of the destruction or tampering of evidence.
Under the traditional doctrine, notice is always provided—even though it
may be given after the fact.73
But SCA warrants do not abide by the same notice requirements. The
SCA framework does not contain a notice requirement for information ob-
tained in certain circumstances. For example, disclosure of ESC from a re-
mote computing service is done “without required notice to the [user].”74
Similarly, ESI disclosure requirements explicitly note that a “governmental
entity receiving records or information . . . is not required to provide notice
to [users].”75 Without notice, the user will never know of the search or sei-
zure unless a prosecutor ultimately files charges.76 Coupled with the fact that
the SCA also does not contain data retention requirements,77 individuals
may be subject to indefinite deprivations of data.78
The underlying concerns shaping the notice requirements for traditional
warrants do not apply to ESI. As noted above, traditional warrants are struc-
tured to minimize the opportunity for the destruction of evidence.79 Once a
paper document is destroyed, it ceases to exist. But the same is not true for
ESI.80 When ESI is deleted, it is transferred to the unallocated slack space on
a server.81 And until that information is overwritten, it can still be accessed.82
Additionally, there is a provision requiring both electronic communications
72 . Id . Notwithstanding the SCA’s explicit authorization of notice-less searches, one
possible argument for notice is that ESI should be treated as a form of the user’s property and
that service providers are only bailees of that property. See infra text accompanying note 111.
Accordingly, receipt to the service provider would not be sufficient because the service provid-
er is not the owner of that property.
73. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(3); 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b) (2012). Notice can sometimes be de-
layed if a court finds “reasonable cause,” but only if the “warrant prohibits the seizure of any
tangible property, [or] any wire or electronic communication.” Id . This default rule requires
that notice be provided within thirty days of the execution of the warrant. Id . § 3013a(b)(3).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
75 . Id . § 2703(c)(3).
76 . See Nakashima, supra note 11.
77 . See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703–11.
78. Although the Department of Justice’s new 2017 guidance implements a one-year
limit, the guidance is not binding on the states. See Rosenstein, supra note 12. Further, because
the rule was implemented through a guidance document—not baked into the statute itself—
the policy could change from administration to administration. Many searches and seizures
carried out under SCA warrants may never provide notice and can never be challenged as un-
constitutional.
79 . See FED. R. CIV. P. 41.
80 . See, e .g ., Genger v. TR Inv’rs, LLC, 26 A.3d 180, 190 n.39 (Del. 2011) (explaining
that even when ESI is deleted it can still exist as unallocated slack space).
81 . Id .
82 . See id .
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services and remote computing services to retain ESI upon request from a
governmental entity.83
The actor executing the warrant is the third significant difference. Tradi-
tional warrants authorize law enforcement agents to conduct the search
themselves,84 whereas SCA warrants require private third-party service pro-
viders to devote both time and resources to conducting the search on behalf
of law enforcement.85 This is significant because SCA warrants impose an
increased burden on the responding third-party service provider.86 This im-
plicit burden also raises questions about how much effort the third-party
service provider must put into the search.87
And finally, traditional warrants have different due process protections
and methods of redress. With clear notice, the person being searched has an
opportunity to be heard—through a motion to suppress evidence when
charges are brought, or through a § 1983 claim against the officers conduct-
ing the search.88 This incentivizes law enforcement officers to request war-
rants based on probable cause that describe the area being searched and the
items being seized with particularity. The SCA affords no such opportunities
for redress because to obtain redress, an individual requires notice of a po-
tential violation. These differences underscore certain procedural due pro-
cess concerns.
B. The Standing Conundrum
The absence of notice to the user highlights the restrictive nature of the
Fourth Amendment’s standing doctrine.89 Standing for purposes of a Fourth
Amendment challenge is much more limited than in other constitutional
doctrines. In Alderman v . United States, the Supreme Court explained that
Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights; they cannot be “vicariously
83. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) (2012).
84 . See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation of a Pen
Register, 610 F.2d 1148, 1154 (3d Cir. 1979).
85 . See In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc., 14 N.Y.S.3d 23, 28–29
(App. Div. 2015).
86 . In re Application for Cell Tower Records Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 90 F. Supp. 3d
673, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (“[The SCA’s] reference to ‘unusually voluminous’ requests implies
that a merely ‘voluminous’ request, perhaps encompassing multiple accounts, is within the
contemplation of the law.” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d))).
87. For example, when running a search for specific emails, does a simple keyword
search suffice or is a more exacting search required? See MICHAEL R. ARKFELD, THE LAW
STUDENT’S GUIDE TO ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND EVIDENCE 5-30 to 5-49 (2016–2017 ed.).
88 . In re 381 Search Warrants, 14 N.Y.S.3d at 27 (“The motion to suppress is the most
important ex post protection available to citizens.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). Whether
a § 1983 claim is truly a “meaningful” opportunity to be heard remains to be seen. See William
Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45 (2018).
89 . E .g ., Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887, 916 (W.D. Wash.
2017).
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asserted.”90 Similarly, in Rakas v . Illinois, the Court made clear that only in-
dividuals who themselves suffered an unreasonable search could seek to ex-
clude evidence under the Fourth Amendment.91 In other words, the
government must have unreasonably searched or seized the person asserting
the Fourth Amendment claim, excluding those situations where the gov-
ernment obtains damaging evidence through an unreasonable search or sei-
zure of a third party.92 Even a possessory interest in the evidence being
searched or seized might not be enough to confer standing.93
But in those cases, the third party was not the only other party that could
reasonably assert the rights of the party that was unreasonably searched.94
Some scholars question whether the lack of available avenues to challenge
SCA warrants might be enough to confer Fourth Amendment standing.95
But thus far, no service provider has been granted standing to object on be-
half of its users.96
III. THE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS ARGUMENT
Because service providers cannot notify a targeted user about the exist-
ence of SCA warrants with nondisclosure orders, service providers have
turned to the courts. These challenges have come in several forms and have
90. 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969).
91. 439 U.S. 128, 143–49 (1978).
92 . See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 (1980) (rejecting the target theory of
standing and “conclud[ing] that the supervisory power does not authorize a federal court to
suppress otherwise admissible evidence on the ground that it was seized unlawfully from a
third party not before the court”).
93 . See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105–06 (1980) (finding that an individual’s
ownership of the drugs located in the searched purse of a third party was not sufficient to con-
fer standing).
94 . Payner, 447 U.S. at 730 (the individual whose briefcase was searched had standing);
Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 104–06 (the owner of the purse may have had standing).
95. Daskal, supra note 11, at 456–59 (arguing for relaxed standing requirements by uti-
lizing the third-party standing test outlined in Powers v . Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410–11 (1991));
Sarah E. Pugh, Comment, Cloudy with a Chance of Abused Privacy Rights: Modifying Third-
Party Fourth Amendment Standing Doctrine Post-Spokeo, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 971 (2017).
96 . E .g ., Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887, 912–15 (W.D.
Wash. 2017) (denying a Fourth Amendment challenge on standing grounds); City & County of
San Francisco v. HomeAway.com, Inc., 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 901, 912–13 (Ct. App. 2018) (finding
that a service provider has no standing to challenge an SCA subpoena on behalf of its users).
There had been some success in challenging the territorial reach of SCA warrants, but recent
legislation has made those arguments unavailable. Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re War-
rant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.), 829
F.3d 197, 222 (2d Cir. 2016) (dismissing the service provider’s First Amendment claims but
sustaining a challenge to the SCA’s extraterritorial reach), cert . granted sub nom ., United States
v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018) (vacating and remanding with instructions to dis-
miss the case as moot because of the amended CLOUD Act, which gave the SCA extraterritori-
al reach).
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been largely unsuccessful.97 Instead of Fourth Amendment challenges, ser-
vice providers should bring due process challenges on behalf of their users.98
Then, perhaps a court will recognize third-party standing.
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.”99 Under this doctrine, “[p]arties whose rights are to be affected are
entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must
first be notified.”100 And as the Supreme Court has previously explained, “the
Fourth Amendment [is not] the sole constitutional provision in question
when the Government seizes property subject to forfeiture.”101 So although
the Fourth Amendment limits the government’s ability to search or seize
property, it is not the only source of protection afforded to property own-
ers.102
This Part argues that the use of SCA warrants violates the procedural
due process rights of individual users. Essential to this argument is the tri-
partite balancing test set forth in Mathews v . Eldridge, which considers:
(1) whether government action implicates a private interest, (2) whether
there is a risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest and the probable val-
ue of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, and (3) whether there is
a justifying government interest.103 Absent notice to targeted users, service
providers will have the best opportunity to challenge SCA warrants them-
selves and potentially even on behalf of their users.104 Section III.A argues
that the warrants implicate users’ constitutional interests. Section III.B ex-
plores the risks of erroneous deprivation. Section III.C argues that there is no
justifying government interest.
97. Some have been dismissed on standing grounds. See supra Section II.B. Others have
unsuccessfully argued that 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) authorizes service providers to quash SCA war-
rants that are “unusually voluminous in nature” or create an “undue burden.” See In re 381
Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc., 14 N.Y.S.3d 23, 29 n.4 (App. Div. 2015). But at
least one court has limited this authority to objections to court orders, rather than warrants. Id .
at 29.
98. Professor Orin Kerr previously wrote an article arguing that service providers may
have a pre-enforcement procedural due process objection to SCA warrants based on the com-
pliance costs rather than a Fourth Amendment objection asserting their users’ rights. Orin
Kerr, New York Court of Appeals to Hear Argument in ‘In re 381 Search Warrants’ Case, WASH.
POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2017/02/06/new-york-court-of-appeals-to-hear-argument-in-in-re-381-search-
warrants-case/ [https://perma.cc/JD4J-XCCP].
99. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
100. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.)
223, 233 (1863).
101. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 49 (1993).
102 . Id . at 52.
103 . See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
104 . See infra Part IV.
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A. Constitutional Interests
Users that are the subject of criminal charges after authorities execute an
SCA warrant receive due process: these users eventually obtain notice of the
deprivation and have a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Users with no-
tice can move to suppress the evidence gleaned from a warrant that violates
the Fourth Amendment or bring a § 1983 claim.105 The notice problem be-
comes an issue when charges are never brought against a targeted user. If
charges are never brought, the user may never know that a search was con-
ducted that may have violated whatever property interest the user has in
their ESI.106
This implicates a quasi-property interest.107 Although a full-fledged
property interest in one’s own data has not been formally recognized, this
Note argues that a quasi-property interest exists in ESI. There has been some
scholarly discussion about the merits and drawbacks of treating data as per-
sonal property,108 but there also is a strong argument that individuals have at
least a quasi-property interest in their ESI. Property is a general term for a
bundle of rights typically associated with physical things, like homes, cars,
phones, or even more ephemeral things like intellectual property.109 This
105. Section 1983 claims are notoriously difficult to win. See Baude, supra note 88, at 48.
106 . See In re Application of Jason Leopold to Unseal Certain Elec. Surveillance Applica-
tions & Orders, 300 F. Supp. 3d 61, 86 (D.D.C. 2018) (“Although the SCA contains no similar
default sealing or nondisclosure provisions, the SCA authorizes the government to seek such
nondisclosure and, in practice, the government has ‘always been able to restrict access’ to SCA
warrants and § 2703(d) orders ‘by requesting a sealing order, regardless of the statutory de-
fault,’ and to delay or preclude a notification to a subscriber or customer of an SCA warrant or
§ 2703(d) order’s existence.” (quoting In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 2703(d), 707 F.3d 283, 291 n.9 (4th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted))).
107. There may also be an argument that a liberty interest is implicated: the interest in
being free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Although several courts have recognized
this specific liberty interest in the Fourth Amendment context, see, e .g ., Washington v. Lam-
bert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 1996), some courts have carried the interest over into the
procedural due process context, see, e .g ., Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 605 (2d Cir.
1999); see also Schweitzer v. Crofton, 560 F. App’x 6, 10–11 (2d Cir. 2014) (recognizing a due
process interest to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures but concluding that the
interest was not violated). But see Bostrom v. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs., 969 F. Supp.
2d 393, 415 (D.N.J. 2013) (“If the court were to find [a deprivation of such a liberty interest in
the procedural due process context,] then all unreasonable searches would constitute proce-
dural due process claims.”).
108. Although some scholars argue against treating data as property, see, e .g ., Jessica Lit-
man, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1295–301 (2000), oth-
ers assert quasi-property rights as a potential step to protect an individual’s property rights,
Gianclaudio Malgieri, “Ownership” of Customer (Big) Data in the European Union: Quasi-
Property as Comparative Solution?, J. INTERNET L., Nov. 2016, at 3, 8–10.
109 . See J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 712
(1996). Although there are other property theories beyond the “bundle-of-rights,” the bundle
of rights metaphor is descriptively useful to describe the complex relationship that may arise
from data bailment. See Jane B. Baron, Rescuing the Bundle-of-Rights Metaphor in Property
Law, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 57, 58–59 (2013).
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“bundle of rights” is abstract: it is often described as including the right to
use property, exclude others from that property, and sell that property.110 If
ESI is a user’s property, the user retains an interest in it and is able to control
its alienability.111 This argument has intuitive appeal: just because another
party has access or possession over the user’s property does not necessarily
mean that the user no longer owns that property.112 As Justice Gorsuch not-
ed in his dissent in United States v . Carpenter, data can be thought of as an
individual’s “papers and effects.”113 If handing a physical private document
to a third party would not eliminate your property interest, neither should
entrusting your data to a third party.114
But the argument for a full-fledged property right is not broadly accept-
ed and could affect how companies commodify user data.115 Some may argue
that ESI should not be treated like property because the user is “giving up”
their information by engaging in online conduct, effectively waiving any
downstream rights over how the information is subsequently used.116 And
technically the third party is making carbon copies of, not seizing, the ESI.
Also, granting users the unfettered ability to exclude or alienate their own
information after giving it up may have problematic consequences.117 Treat-
ing ESI under the quasi-property framework instead might better “allow for
equitable relief to become readily available for infraction of the entitle-
ment.”118
The term “quasi-property” refers to the “relational entitlement mecha-
nism to simulate property’s exclusionary framework within limited settings,”
and is commonly associated with the Supreme Court’s decision in Interna-
tional News Service v . Associated Press.119 In that case, the Associated Press
(“AP”) sued the International News Service for copying the substance of the
110. Penner, supra note 109, at 717–18; see also Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
111 . Cf . Penner, supra note 109, at 742 (“Thus there are two sides to the coin of proper-
ty—one inward-looking, the protection of the owner in his use of his own, and one outward-
looking, his power to alienate his property to others . . . .”). When another party has control
over your personal property, it is called a bailment. It is the “delivery of personal property by
one person (the bailor) to another (the bailee) who holds the property for a certain purpose.”
Bailment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
112 . See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2268–69 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissent-
ing).
113 . Id .
114 . Id .; see also 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 36 (2017).
115 . See Litman, supra note 108.
116 . Id . at 1300–01.
117 . Id . (explaining that allowing bargaining for downstream use and alienability would
decrease consumer privacy).
118. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Quasi-Property: Like, but Not Quite Property, 160 U. PA. L.
REV. 1889, 1913 (2012).
119 . Id . at 1891–92.
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AP’s news stories, rewriting them, and selling them.120 The Supreme Court
found that a quasi-property interest existed.121 Even though there was no full
right to alienability as with traditional property rights, the AP still had a lim-
ited right to exclude their competitors from the substance of their articles for
a limited amount of time.122 In essence, quasi-property means that an object
is property for some circumstances, but not for others. There may be a lim-
ited right to exclude or alienate.123 Quasi-property interests have been recog-
nized in several other contexts: biomedicine and sepulchre;124 trade secret;125
reputation for purpose of trademark dilution claims.126
There is a strong argument for a quasi-property interest in ESI. Just as
handing a physical document to a third party does not eliminate the proper-
ty interest therein,127 neither should handing data to a third party. Even
though users do not have comprehensive control over their data, the privacy
statutes of several states, along with the General Data Protection Regulation
(“GDPR”) in the European Union, have begun to grant users rights to ESI
that look more and more like controls on alienability and the right to ex-
clude.128 Some may argue there is never a “deprivation” because ESI is only
copied and never removed. But there is a deprivation of the quasi-property
right, in that the user is no longer able to exert the same level of control over
their personal information. Recognition of these rights would expand the
remedies available to users while still avoiding the expressive commodifica-
tion associated with a full-fledged property right.129 If users have a quasi-
property right in their ESI, then the due process argument will be viable.
120. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 231 (1918).
121 . Id . at 236.
122 . Id . at 245–46.
123. Balganesh, supra note 118, at 1893.
124 . E .g ., Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 796–97 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding
that plaintiffs “had property interests in the corneas of their deceased children protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). But see Florida v. Powell, 497 So. 2d
1188, 1193 (Fla. 1986) (holding that there was “no protectable liberty or property interest in the
remains of their decedents”); Ga. Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga.
1985) (“[I]n Georgia, there is no constitutionally protected right in a decedent’s body.”).
125. Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy as Quasi-Property, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1113, 1131
(2016).
126. Balganesh, supra note 118, at 1897–98 (citing Kathleen B. McCabe, Note, Dilution-
by-Blurring: A Theory Caught in the Shadow of Trademark Infringement, 68 FORDHAM L. REV.
1827, 1835 (2000)).
127 . See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
128 . See Malgieri, supra note 108, at 9–10 (arguing that the GDPR is a form of quasi-
property based on relational, relative forbearance); see also California Consumer Privacy Act of
2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120 (2018) (giving consumers the right to have some down-
stream control of their data); id . § 1798.105 (giving consumers the right to request data dele-
tion from businesses that collect personal information).
129 . See Balganesh, supra note 118, at 1914; see also Litman, supra note 108.
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B. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The second Mathews factor weighs the risk that the administrative pro-
cedure will work an erroneous deprivation of the private interest, as well as
the probable value of any added procedural safeguards to reduce the risk.130
This factor focuses on the “fairness and reliability” of the existing procedures
governing the deprivation.131 The risk of an erroneous deprivation stems
from the lack of a notice and hearing requirement—eliminating a crucial
check on government.
In the civil forfeiture context, the Supreme Court has explained that
“[t]he practice of ex parte seizure . . . creates an unacceptable risk of error.”132
The same is true in the SCA context. There is a significant risk of erroneous
deprivation of users’ liberty and quasi-property interests when the govern-
ment executes an overly broad SCA warrant. If the underlying SCA warrant
is invalid or overbroad, it should not have issued, and any seizure of ESI is
erroneous.133 Further, without any meaningful check, the government’s ten-
dency toward dragnet surveillance goes unfettered.134 If users and third par-
ties are unable to challenge a potentially overbroad search, users will not
have redress135 and will not be able to serve as a crucial check on government
overreach. Without such deterrence, the government will be emboldened to
issue overly broad, general SCA warrants as in In re 381 Search Warrants.136
This lack of deterrence and the inability to check the government’s probable
cause determination, coupled with the lack of a meaningful or a timely op-
portunity to be heard, creates a significant risk of erroneous deprivation.
Without a data-deletion requirement,137 users are potentially subjected
to an unlimited deprivation of the quasi-property interests in their data. Fur-
ther, because service providers are generally precluded from informing their
users of the search and do not have standing to assert users’ Fourth
Amendment rights,138 any erroneous deprivations that occur will be effec-
130. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
131 . Id . at 343–44.
132. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 55 (1993).
133 . See United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 439 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he warrant was
facially overbroad and thus violated the Fourth Amendment . . . .”).
134 . Cf . Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580–81, 580 n.9 (1975) (citing Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170–72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(“[F]airness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of
rights. . . . No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in
jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.”)).
135 . Cf . Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 157 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Victims of unreasonable
searches or seizures may recover damages directly related to the invasion of their privacy—
including (where appropriate) damages for physical injury, property damage, injury to reputa-
tion, etc. . . . .” (quoting Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1999))).
136 . See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
137 . See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–11 (2012).
138 . In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc., 14 N.Y.S.3d 23, 25 (App. Div.
2015).
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tively immunized from challenge or review. This factor should weigh in fa-
vor of either providing notice or some other method to check the scope and
validity of a warrant.
C. Addressing Government Interests
The government may have several important interests at issue. The gov-
ernment has an interest in the speedy execution of its warrant to prevent da-
ta or evidence destruction, and in investigating and solving crimes quickly.
So, the argument goes, extremely delayed or nonexistent notice is needed to
prevent criminals from rushing to delete their ESI and abscond.139
Though these interests are surely legitimate to some extent, they are not
impacted by a notice requirement. Underlying the government’s concern is
the fear that because data is more ephemeral, it can be easily and quickly de-
leted and the government can lose vital evidence.140 Under the current SCA
framework, the government can issue a preservation order, which requires
that service providers copy and retain the targeted user’s data in their posses-
sion for up to ninety days while a warrant is pending. 141 This preservation
obligation adequately addresses the government’s concern. If the data is cop-
ied and preserved, the government will obtain at least as much ESI as was on
the third-party servers at the time a magistrate approved the warrant. This
provides no opportunity for the user to delete their ESI before the warrant is
executed.
Indeed, the existing preservation requirements provide the government
with security it does not have when dealing with physical property.142 As-
sume that, once again, Jack will be the target of a search. Once the govern-
ment wishes to start the clock, it can issue a preservation order to
Facebook.143 Facebook must then “take all necessary steps” to preserve all the
evidence in its possession without notifying Jack.144 This presumably covers
any additional ESI that Jack creates during that time. On day eighty-nine, the
government can serve Facebook with the SCA warrant.145 This system essen-
tially allows the target to be under supervision for three months while a
court order is pending. Accordingly, preservation orders adequately address
the government’s fear of deletion. The procedural safeguard this Note advo-
139 . E .g ., id .
140 . See In re Search Warrant for [Redacted].com, 248 F. Supp. 3d 970, 982 (C.D. Cal.
2017) (recognizing that the government has an interest in protecting its investigation).
141. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) (“A provider of wire or electronic communication services or a
remote computing service, upon the request of a governmental entity, shall take all necessary
steps to preserve records and other evidence in its possession pending the issuance of a court
order or other process.”).
142 . See id .
143 . See id .
144 . See id .
145 . See id . It is important to note that the warrant may only cover a subset of the infor-
mation preserved. In that circumstance, the scope of the warrant will be complied with.
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cates for is guaranteed notice after the fact. Providing such notice would not
significantly affect the government interest; it would do nothing more than
allow individuals an opportunity to be heard if the search is overbroad or
unreasonable.
If there were some ongoing or repeated investigation into a target,
meaning that an SCA warrant was issued periodically to gather additional
evidence without a charge being brought, perhaps guaranteed notice would
then implicate the government interest. There is no denying that after-the-
fact notice would signal to the targeted user that they are being searched.
That said, an ongoing search of that sort is not permitted with respect to the
physical world, even when there are significant government interests at
play.146
The government interests are outweighed by the individual interests and
high risk of erroneous deprivation. Therefore, a guaranteed notice require-
ment would not significantly affect the government interests. Based on this
analysis, SCA warrants with nondisclosure provisions seem to run afoul of
the requisite amount of process due under the Constitution.
IV. THIRD-PARTY STANDING UNDER A DUE PROCESS THEORY
The lack of notice for some searches carried out pursuant to SCA war-
rants violates the procedural due process rights of individual users. In at least
some non-negligible set of cases, no one will be able to challenge the validity
or scope of an SCA warrant, potentially for some extended period of time.147
A statutory solution to this conundrum would be best.148 But because the
legislature can often move slowly, and in recent times somewhat unpredicta-
bly, this Note argues that by challenging SCA warrants under a procedural
due process theory, as opposed to a Fourth Amendment theory, an opening
arises for third-party standing.
Addressing the interests of users in this context is difficult because ser-
vice providers do not have standing to bring a Fourth Amendment challenge
to defective SCA warrants on behalf of their users.149 Fourth Amendment
standing is much more difficult to establish than standing to assert other
constitutional rights.150 Accordingly, arguing that there is also a procedural
146 . See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text. Outside of the SCA, notice can gen-
erally be delayed if a court finds reasonable cause that immediate notice would have an adverse
result; and even then it can only be delayed for a reasonable period not to exceed thirty days in
most circumstances. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(3); 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b). Upon a showing of good
cause and an “updated showing of the need for further delay,” the court can extend the delayed
notice for additional periods of up to ninety days. 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(c).
147 . See supra note 12 and accompanying text; Daskal, supra note 11, at 440.
148. For a statutory proposal that focuses on this issue, see Daskal, supra note 11, at 459–
60. For a broader proposal, see Kerr, A User’s Guide, supra note 6, at 1233–42.
149 . E .g ., In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc., 14 N.Y.S.3d 23, 25 (App.
Div. 2015); see also Section II.B.
150 . See Section II.B. For an argument that third-party standing should exist in the SCA
context, see Daskal, supra note 11.
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due process issue based on implication of a quasi-property right creates a
stronger standing argument.
To argue for third-party standing under a due process theory, service
providers can rely on a line of Supreme Court cases that relax the standing
rules for claims that could not otherwise be brought. This concept was first
signaled in NAACP v . Alabama, where the Court created organizational
standing.151 There, although the Court acknowledged that constitutional
rights are personal, it still permitted the NAACP to bring a due process claim
on behalf of its members because the members’ rights could not otherwise be
vindicated.152 A third-party standing theory similarly focused on making
process available was advanced in Barrows v . Jackson, an equal protection
case. The Supreme Court relaxed the standing rules because it would be “dif-
ficult if not impossible for the persons whose rights are asserted to present
their grievance before any court.”153 White neighbors sued Jackson to try to
indirectly enforce a racially restrictive covenant; Jackson had sold a home to
black buyers in violation of the constitutionally infirm covenant.154 The
Court ultimately held that Jackson had standing to raise an equal protection
claim on behalf of the buyers, who were not parties to the contract and who
were not in court.155 Similarly, in Eisenstadt v . Baird, a third-party activist
was granted standing on behalf of individuals who were procedurally unable
to bring their own claims.156 A Massachusetts law outlawed distribution of
contraceptives, except by physicians or pharmacists, and then only to mar-
ried individuals.157 Baird intentionally violated the law and was prosecut-
ed.158 He was ultimately allowed to raise an objection on behalf of third
parties not before the court because “unmarried persons denied access to
contraceptives . . . [were] not themselves subject to prosecution and, to that
extent, [were] denied a forum in which to assert their own rights.”159 Just like
in Barrows, the Court permitted third-party standing because the affected
individuals had no other opportunity to have their claims heard.
151. 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958) (“[T]his Court has generally insisted that parties rely only
on constitutional rights which are personal to themselves . . . . The principle is not disrespected
where constitutional rights of persons who are not immediately before the Court could not be
effectively vindicated except through an appropriate representative before the Court.”).
152 . NAACP, 357 U.S. at 459.
153. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953).
154 . Id . at 251–52.
155 . Id . at 255–57 (“Ordinarily, one may not claim standing in this Court to vindicate the
constitutional rights of some third party. . . . But in the instant case, we are faced with a unique
situation in which it is the action of the state court which might result in a denial of constitu-
tional rights and in which it would be difficult if not impossible for the persons whose rights
are asserted to present their grievance before any court.”).
156. 405 U.S. 438, 443–46 (1972).
157 . Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 440–41.
158 . Id . at 440.
159 . Id . at 446.
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Under this line of cases, when individuals are in the precarious position
of being unable to challenge a government practice that implicates their per-
sonal rights, third-party standing may arise. It may be the best—or the on-
ly—method to safeguard and vindicate the individuals’ constitutional rights.
In the context of SCA warrant challenges, service providers will need to rely
on Powers v . Ohio, the seminal third-party standing case.160 To assert third-
party standing, three criteria must be met: (1) “[t]he litigant must have suf-
fered an ‘injury in fact,’ ” so that the litigant has a “ ‘sufficiently concrete in-
terest’ in the outcome of the issue”; (2) “the litigant must have a close
relation to [the user]”; and (3) “there must exist some hindrance to the [us-
er’s] ability to protect his or her own interests.”161
In most circumstances with SCA warrants, service providers will have
suffered sufficient injury in fact and will have a sufficient interest in the out-
come. To comply with SCA warrants, the service provider must search, cull,
and produce data responsive to the warrants’ requirements.162 When service
providers must expend resources on compliance, they forego the free use of
their equipment and the efficient allocation of their employees’ time. This
may be sufficient to meet the first prong for third-party standing, and the ar-
gument has some support at least one circuit. The Third Circuit found that a
warrant requiring a telephone company to provide technical assistance suffi-
ciently implicated the company’s property interest to justify a limited pre-
enforcement hearing.163 If such a minimal use of time and resources is suffi-
cient to justify a hearing in that circumstance, courts should generally find it
sufficient to meet the first prong.
Next, service providers also have a sufficiently close relationship with
their users. The close relation prong looks at whether “the relationship be-
tween the [service provider] and the [user] may be such that the former is
fully, or very nearly, as effective a proponent of the right as the latter.”164 The
nature of the relationship between service providers and users is special, and
it creates several incentives that align the interests of both parties. Service
providers are in control of the user’s ESI and have more resources than the
individual user, giving them the ability to effectively advocate for the user’s
rights. Service providers also hold an astronomical amount of private data in
their online repositories.165 Social media sites boast billions of active daily
160. 499 U.S. 400, 410–411 (1991).
161 . Powers, 499 U.S. at 410–11 (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112–16
(1976)).
162 . See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), (c), (g) (2012).
163 . In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation of a Pen Reg-
ister, 610 F.2d 1148, 1157 (3d Cir. 1979).
164 . See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 115 (1976).
165 . See Daskal, supra note 18, at 377 (“Nowadays, however, it is no longer feasible to
participate in a digital world without exposing an incredible wealth of private information—
including one’s associations and private thoughts—to a third party.”).
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users.166 Online repositories contain conversations between individuals and
their families, their partners, their closest confidants, their attorneys, and
their coworkers. This puts service providers into a position of power with
respect to their users. But service providers have economic incentives to pro-
tect the privacy interests of their users in order to avoid lost business, lost
profits, and reputational harm.167 These incentives align the interests of ser-
vice providers and their users. So, if a service provider is able to challenge an
SCA warrant, it will likely do so with the same goals in mind. Service provid-
ers are also the most logical party to bring these challenges: they are often
well represented and they can challenge multiple warrants at one time. Per-
mitting such challenges would be the most economical approach.
Finally, as argued above, there is a significant hindrance to users assert-
ing their own rights. Without notice, a user cannot protect their own consti-
tutional interests. As Professor Daskal explains, the recent policy change in-
instituted by the Department of Justice only discusses nondisclosure orders
of up to one year, but “during that year, the government may collect, and
perhaps disseminate, a significant amount of information about a target.”168
Plus, the year-long delay can be renewed and extended.169 During that time,
the user’s ability to assert their rights is hindered.
As this exercise demonstrates, service providers have a strong claim for
third-party standing under the Powers test. Allowing timely challenges has a
number of policy benefits. Courts can finally provide a needed check on gov-
ernment overreach in an administrable way. Permitting these challenges
would rein in current SCA warrant practices to look more like those of tradi-
tional warrants and increase government transparency. Service providers
would also benefit. They could chip away at the prevalence of overly broad
SCA warrants. This, presumably, would save the money and resources that
would otherwise go toward execution of such warrants. For users, the bene-
fits are obvious: their constitutional interests could be vindicated. To reap
these benefits, service providers should change the types of challenges they
bring from Fourth Amendment challenges to Fifth Amendment challenges.
166. Facebook reports 1.49 billion daily active users on average for September 2018.
Company Info, FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM, https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/
[https://perma.cc/FQ5X-BKX5].
167 . See Pat Conroy et al., Building Consumer Trust: Protecting Personal Data in the Con-
sumer Product Industry, DELOITTE INSIGHTS (Nov. 13, 2014), https://dupress.deloitte.com/
dup-us-en/topics/risk-management/consumer-data-privacy-strategies.html [https://perma.cc/
LXB4-FD3W]; David Hoffman, Privacy Is a Business Opportunity, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 18,
2014), https://hbr.org/2014/04/privacy-is-a-business-opportunity [https://perma.cc/2MSR-
JBAX].
168. Daskal, supra note 11, at 457.
169 . Id .; see also Rosenstein, supra note 12.
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CONCLUSION
The government’s ability to obtain ESI without providing notice to users
implicates users’ right to procedural due process. It deprives them of a quasi-
property interest without the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time.
And because the Stored Communications Act does not include a data-
deletion provision, it may result in an indefinite deprivation of those rights.
Absent a statutory fix to this problem, allowing third-party service pro-
viders to vindicate the rights of their users makes sense. The concept of pri-
vacy rights is changing with the increase in digitized communications.
Individuals are increasingly using third-party service providers to store, pro-
tect, or communicate their most private information. And in response, law
enforcement is increasingly using data collected from third-party service
providers, except without meaningful notice to the targeted users. The SCA’s
secret searches have created an impossible problem for its targets. But fram-
ing the issue under procedural due process may allow third parties to assert
the rights of their users. It would serve as an essential check on government
overreach. Without such a check, there is little incentive for government
agencies to tailor the scope of their SCA warrants. Instead, SCA warrants will
continue to be excessive and invasive.
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